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Disqualification: Discharge for Misconduct
and Voluntary Quit*
EDWIN R. TEPLEt
The framers of the unemployment insurance program in this
country determined that not all unemployed individuals should
receive benefits. The State laws uniformly require a minimum
amount of earnings within the established base period in order to
test the worker's attachment to the labor market.1 To make certain
that his attachment is current and genuine, there is also a provision
that he must be able to work and available for work.
2
Notwithstanding the worker's attachment to the labor market,
moreover, he still will not qualify if his unemployment is the result
of his being on strike.- Whether it is to preserve the neutrality of
* The views expressed herein are entirely those of the author and are not
intended to reflect in any way the official viewpoint of the Federal Security
Agency. The author wishes to acknowledge the helpfulness of material on this
subject prepared and made available by Laurence A. Price, Chief Counsel of
the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission.
t Assistant Regional Attorney, Region IV, Federal Security Agency.
I As of January 1, 1949, 26 States required earnings equal to aspecified
multiple of the weekly benefit amount and 4 States used a weighted table with
varying multiples thereof. Eighteen States had a flat qualifying wage ranging
from $100 to $300, with Ohio falling within this group by requiring a fixed
amount of base period earnings and a flat number of weeks of employment
(Ohio Code, sec. 1345-6a (1)-which, under the 1949 amendments, specifies
earnings of $240 and 14 weeks of employment). Michigan and Wisconsin speci-
fied that an individual must have worked a fixed number of weeks at a mini-
mum weekly wage, and Utah required base period wages equal to at least 150
per cent of the individual's high quarter wages and 14 per cent of the average
State-wide wage. See, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws
(1948 ed.), published by the Federal Security Agency's Bureau of Employment
Security, pp. 37-41. Attachment to the labor market is one of the earmarks of
an insurance system as compared with the public assistance programs in thsi
country, where need is the principal criterion, or the one-time "dole" in Eng-
land. Those who would discredit the unemployment insurance system in this
country still insist on referring to it as a dole. Of course, there is an assumed
need at the base of any social insurance system, and it is this which justifies, or
at least explains, some of the otherwise illogical provisions, such as the weight-
ing of benefit tables to provide proportionately larger payments for those in
the lower income brackets and the increasingly popular family allowances.
2 See, Freeman, Availability: Active Search for Work, p. 181; Freeman,
Able to Work and Available for Work, 55 YALE L. J. 123 (1945).
'The terminology varies somewhat in the different State laws, "strike,"
"labor dispute," and "trade dispute" all being used without much apparent
difference in actual application. The typical provision imposes the disqualifica-
tion whenever the unemployment is due to a stoppage of work which exists
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the State in such difficult and controversial matters, or merely
because a strike is considered a form of voluntary action, anyone
connected therewith is disqualified at least for a time.4
Having cleared these hurdles successfully, the prospective
claimant may still fall flat on his face, figuratively speaking, if a
job is offered to him and he turns it down, since all State laws
contain disqualifications for refusing suitable work. The so-called
labor standards provision, required for conformity with the Fed-
eral act,5 guarantees that benefits shall not be denied under the
express conditions specified, but beyond this, it depends upon the
provisions of the particular State law to what extent the worker
because of a labor dispute. Seven States, as of 1948, specifically exclude lock-
outs from the operation of the provision, and five States exclude disputes due
to the employer's failure to conform to the provisions of a labor contract or to
wage and hour or collective bargaining legislation. Usually this disqualification
applies only where the labor dispute occurs in the establishment, or as the Ohio
law puts it, in the factory, establishment or other premises, where the claimant
was employed, although Idaho omits this provision altogether. Connecticut
includes unemployment due to the existence of a labor dispute in any estab-
lishment operated by the employer within the State, and Oregon includes a
dispute at any other premises which the employer operates if the dispute makes
it impossible for him to conduct work normally. Michigan disqualifies those
who stop work in sympathy with strikers in another department or establish-
ment as well as anyone indirectly unemployed because of a stoppage of work
in some other department or unit. The great majority of State laws (Ohio is
one of the exceptions) provide that the disqualification shall not apply if the
individuals in question, and any others of the same grade or class, are not
participating in the dispute, financing it, or directly interested therein. See,
Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, pp. 67-69 (1948), pub-
lished by the Federal Security Agency's Bureau of Employment Security.
'In New York, the disqualification ends after 7 weeks and in Rhode Island
an 8-week period is specified. Thirty-five States extend it to the termination of
the work stoppage, while 14 others impose it so long as the labor dispute is in
active progress, or so long as the unemployment is due thereto. Id. For a dis-
cussion of this disqualification, see Comment, p. 238; also, Lesser, Labor Dis-
putes and Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L. J., 167 (1945).
rSection 1603 (a) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code, formerly a part of the
Social Security Act, requires that State unemployment insurance laws, to
qualify for tax credit for employers within the State, must contain provision
that: "Compensation shall not be denied in such State to any otherwise eligible
individual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following condi-
tions: (A) If the position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout, or
other labor dispute; (B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of the work
offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing
for similar work in the locality; (C) if as a condition of being employed the
individual would be required to join a company union or to resign from or
refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization." As a result, every State
unemployment insurance law contains language which is identical, or nearly so,
except that most State provisions are not limited to new work but provide that
no work shall be considered suitable under the circumstances specified. In
effect, the labor standards provision makes a finding of unsuitability mandatory
in any case where its provisions are applicable.
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may safely exercise judgment in declining any offer that is made.6
Finally, all State laws prescribe some disqualification for indi-
viduals who quit their jobs voluntarily 7 or who are guilty of mis-
conduct resulting in dischargeA It is with these last two types of
disqualification that this article is concerned."
"In addition to the mandatory minimum standards, most State laws list
certain criteria which are to be considered in determining the suitability of
work offered. These ordinarily include: the degree of risk to a claimant's
health, safety, and morals; his physical fitness and prior training, experience
and carnings; the length of his unemployment and prospects for securing work
in his customary occupation; and the distance of the available work from his
residence. Failure, without good cause, to apply for available suitable work
when so directed by the State employment service, or to accept suitable work
when offered, is the cause of disqualification in most States, although important
variations in the language of this provision occur in a number of the laws. The
Ohio law formerly required acceptance of any work for which the claimant was
reasonably fitted, but the 1949 amendments embodied in S.B. 142 substitute the
"suitable work" language along with a specific definition of the term "suitable."
Ten States disqualify a worker under this provision for a specified number of
wecks following the week in which the refusal occurred; thirty States postpone
benefits for a variable number of weeks; and twelve States impose a disqualifi-
cation for the duration of the unemployment. At least 16 of these States reduce
or cancel benefit rights when this disqualification is imposed. See, Comparison
of State Unenzploymeat I saranee Laws, pp. 64-67 (1948), a publication of the
Federal Security Agency's Bureau of Employment Security. See, also, Menard,
Rt iasc of Sz'itable Work, 55 YALE L. J. 134 (1945).
The disqualification normally applies to any worker who voluntarily leaves
his job without good cause. In 16 States, however, good cause is operative only
if it is connected with the work or attributable to the employment. In 12 States
the period of disqualification for voluntary leaving is a specified number of
weeks; in 29 States the number of weeks is variable; and in 10 States it extends
for the duration of the unemployment. In 16 States, in addition to postponing
the payment of benefits, the number of weeks for which the claimant would
otherwise be entitled to draw benefits is reduced. See, Comparison of State
Uncrmployrzent Iasuranace Laws (1948), supra, pp. 57-61.
'The typical provision disqualifies any individual who is discharged for
misconduct connected with his work. A few States limit the provision to wilful
misconduct (Connecticut and Pennsylvania), deliberate disregard of the em-
ployer's interest (Massachusetts), and failure to obey orders (Georgia).
Thirty-six States postpone benefits under this provision for a variable number
of weeks; and 6 States apply it for the duration of the unemployment (Florida
has a double provision and falls within both of these categories). Sixteen
States, in addition, cancel part or all of the claimant's benefit rights. At least
12 States have special provisions for the more reprehensible types of miscon-
duct, such as: dishonest or criminal acts; gross, flagrant, wilful, and unlawful
misconduct; forgery, larceny or embezzlement; and arson, intoxication, sabo-
tage or dishonesty. A heavier penalty is provided in these cases. In Ohio, for
instance, a claimant convicted of dishonesty in connection with his work is
disqualified for the duration of his unemployment. Id., at 61-64.
"Some State laws contain additional disqualification provisions applicable
to particular limited gToups. Twenty-nine States disqualify individuals found
guilty of misrepresentation in connection with their claims for benefits. Nine-
teen States have special disqualifications relating to unemployment due to
194 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 10
At the outset, it may be important to determine whether, in a
given case, the worker quit or was discharged. These two disquali-
fications are closely related, and most State laws provide the same
consequences in either event, 10 but if they differ, the nature of the
separation may become significant." Moreover, the claimant must
have good cause for quitting to avoid disqualification, but if it was
a discharge, he can qualify for benefits unless the employer's action
was the result of misconduct connected with the work.
For practical purposes, it is submitted that the question of
whether the worker was fired or quit should be settled on the basis
of who initiated the final separation. If the worker approached the
boss and in effect said: "I'm through, finished, washed up," any
subsequent conversation would appear superfluous. Of course, if
the worker at that point was persuaded to stay and subsequently
the boss walked over and announced that he had decided to accept
the worker's resignation after all, the situation is entirely different
and the shoe would appear to be on the other foot. It is immaterial
that one of the parties may have provoked the other into taking the
initiative,'12 but at the same time the one who actually takes the
pregnancy, while 17 have broader provisions applicable to unemployment due
to marital obligations. Students receive special attention in a few States and
many laws suspend or reduce benefits during weeks when income from other
specified sources is being received, such as dismissal wages, workmen's com-
pensation, or old-age and survivors insurance. Id at 69-74. By the 1949 amend-
ments, the Ohio law disqualifies anyone who advocates, or belongs to a party
which advocates, the overthrow of the government by force. Am. S.B. 142.
"' In at least 29 States, the length of the disqualification period is the same.
Id., table 21. The Ohio law formerly imposed entirely different penalties,
voluntary leaving causing a disqualification for the entire period of the unem-
ployment together with required additional earnings, while discharge for mis-
conduct resulted in an additional waiting period of 3 weeks with a cancellation
of 6 weeks of benefits. This probably explains the low percentage of discharge
cases in Ohio. Under the 1949 amendments, however, identical penalties are
imposed, consisting of a 4-week postponement after the week of the quit or
discharge and a cancellation of 3 weeks of benefits. Am. S.B. 142.
1Of the States which differentiate, the majority make the discharge dis-
qualification more severe. The most common variation, however, merely raises
the discretionary maximum number of weeks for which benefit payments may
be postponed, and under similar circumstances, therefore, the penalty period in
actual application is likely to be the same.
I MacFarland v. Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 418, 45 A. 2d 423 (1946).
In this case, a safety engineer, in an effort to provide greater safety facilities,
went beyond his jurisdiction to such an extent that he was discharged. The
court held that the discharge under these circumstances could not be considered
a voluntary quit so as to bring about a disqualification under the provisions of
the Pennsylvania law prior to 1945, on the theory that the worker's conduct had
brought about the discharge. See, also, In re Lynch, 148 Pa. Super. 249, 24 A.
2d 924 (1942), in which the court held that a separation could not be considered
a voluntary quit where there was evidence that the worker was laid off. In
Grand Island Baking Co. v. Franz, 4 N.W. 2d 921 (Neb. 1942), the claimant,
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final step cannot conceal the true nature of what occurred by forcing
or tricking the other into accepting the onus of the event.13
DISCHARGE FOR MISCONDUCT
Once the separation has been identified as a discharge, it
becomes necessary to establish the fact that such action was the
result of a particular act or acts, or a conscious omission, by the
claimant. Obviously, unless it can be shown that something occurred
which justified and brought about the discharge, and that the
claimant was the one responsible for such occurrence, it cannot be
found that the discharge was for misconduct.
14
The most difficult question, of course, is determining what sort
of action, or failure to act, amounts to misconduct within the
meaning of the act. It goes almost without saying that the term
involves more than mere inefficiency or a failure to live up to work
standards set by the employer. Misconduct is defined as improper
conduct or bad behavior; mismanagement; or improper acts or
instances of misbehavior. 1 Some element of intent or negligence
approaching wantonness must ordinarily be present.16
when advised that the manager wanted to see him, quit on the assumption that
he was about to be fired. Quaere, was the court correct in determining that the
discharge provision was applicable?
' Chellson v. Division of Employment and Security, 214 Minn. 332, 8 N.W.
2d 42 (1943), in which the court held that a resignation obtained under threat
of withholding wages is not a voluntary quit but a discharge.
" It is usually said that the burden of proof in this instance rests upon the
employer. Boynton Cab Co. v. Giese, 237 Wis. 237, 296 N.W. 630 (1941) ; White
v. Phillips, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Neb., par. 1970.01 (1940); Allen v. U.C.C., C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1970.03 (1948). What this actually means is that the
employer is the only reliable source of information as to the reason for dis-
charge, and he cannot complain if the facts necessary to support a denial of the
claim are not forthcoming. Unemployment insurance claims are not adversary
proceedings, and there is no burden of proof in the technical sense. The admin-
istrative agency has the responsibility of determining all the relevant facts, and
the most that can be said of either the employer or the claimant in this connec-
tion is that one or the other, at various times, may carry the risk of non-
persuasion.
FUNK AND WAGNALLS, NEW STANDARD DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE.
'3Kempfer, Disqz alification for Voluntary Leaving and Misconduct, 55
YALE L. J. 147, 162 (1945). According to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 496 N.W. 636 (1941), the term "is
limited to conduct evincing such wilful or wanton disregard of an employer's
interests, as is found in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of
behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employee, or in care-
lessness or negligence of such degree or recurrence as to manifest equal cul-
pability, wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an intentional and sub-
stantial disregard of the employer's interests or of the employee's duties and
obligations to his employer. On the other hand, mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory
conduct, failure in good performance as the result of inability or incapacity,
19491
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A deliberate violation of reasonable rules or orders of an em-
ployer has frequently been held to constitute misconduct. Drinking
liquor while on duty falls within this category, 17 as well as reporting
for work under the influence of liquor. 8 Where, on several occa-
sions, the employee has left his work without permission and with-
out the employer's knowledge, there is said to be sufficient evidence
of misconduct.19 Employers frequently have rules prohibiting so-
licitation during working hours, which is held to include activities
designed to interest fellow employees in union membership. A
deliberate violation of such a rule is considered misconduct,20 but
giving a union card to a fellow worker at lunch at the latter's
request is a different matter.21
Excessive absence from work without sufficient reason may
constitute misconduct, 2 but remaining away for a short period
usually is not considered to justify such a finding.23
Where discharge results from some infraction of the rules gov-
erning the relationship of the employer with the union, the courts
seem to agree that misconduct is not the basis for the action. A
worker's expulsion from the union, for instance, is not based upon
misconduct24 any more than his refusal to join the union in a closed
inadvertencies, or ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors
in judgment or discretion are not to be deemed 'misconduct' within the maening
of the statute."
1 Guede v. Board of Review, C.0.H., U.I. Serv., Pa., par. 8185 (1948). The
claimant, a bartender, had previously been warned not to drink while on duty.
He ignored this instruction on several occasions, and on the day of his discharge
had broken some glasses, spilled several drinks, and was in no condition to
operate the bar.
." Horak v. U.C.C., 0.0.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1970.44 (1948).
Chellson v. Div. of Employment & Security, 214 Minn. 332, 8 N.W. 2d 42
(1943), where the employee left approximately two hours before quitting time
on several Saturdays; Gilbert Co. v. Kordorsky, 56 A. 2d 169 (Conn., 1947),
where the employee's habit of leaving early had delayed production and there
was additional evidence of insubordination.
-Bigelow v. Waselik, 133 Conn. 304, 50 A. 2d 769 (1946).
' Urick v. Board of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1970.09 (1948).
This case is on appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.
2Clock Co. v. Smith, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 8213 (1948), in which
the excessive absenteeism was due partly, but not entirely, to illness; Mysliwski
v. U.C.C., 0.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1970.035 (1948), where the irregular
attendance followed the worker's return to work after an injury. The court in
the latter case explained that if the claimant was unable to work full time, he
was ineligible for that reason.
Being absent for two days was considered not enough in Allen v. U.C.C.
(Mich. Cir. Ct., 1948), C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1970.03. Neither was a
period of four days during which the worker was absent following his vacation.
Scarlett v. Employment Security Commission, 0.0.H., U.I. Serv., Md., par. 8096
(1948).
' Prince v. Schick, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 8205 (1948); Marcy v.
Schick, C.0.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 8206 (1948).
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shop plant. '; A similar conclusion was reached where the employee
had failed to use the union as his bargaining agent.26
Three decisions by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin point the
way rather clearly insofar as performance of the job is concerned.
Where a cab driver left his cab unattended and checked in short,
the court held that inefficiency had been established but not mis-
conduct.27 Neither was it misconduct where the driver was in-
volved in several accidents, in none of which a wilful disregard for
the employer's interests was demonstrated. "8 But where a driver
had six accidents in 7 months, was late several times, and was
guilty of being absent without leave, of "low flagging," and
numerous rule infractions, it was held that misconduct had been
established.-",
If these principles had been applied in some of the other cases,
it is at least doubtful whether the actions referred to therein would
have been classified as misconduct so as to invoke the discharge
disqualification. :"' The Wisconsin view has much to be said in its
favor, both as an accurate interpretation of the statutory language
and an effective means of giving the statute the liberal interpreta-
tion to which it is entitled.-
- Levinson v. U.C.C., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mo., par. 1970.22 (1942).
Webster v. Potlatch Forests, Inc., 187 P. 2d 527 (Idaho, 1947).
- Boynton Cab Co. v. Schroeder, 237 Wis. 264, 296 N.W. 642 (1941).
" Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249, 296 N.W. 636 (1941). In this
case, the driver had also failed to properly report two accidents in accordance
with the employer's rules.
"Checker Cab Co. v. Industrial Commission, 242 Wis. 429, 8 N.W. 2d 286
(1943).
" Kopper's Coal Co. v. Board of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., W.Va., par.
1.76.',2 (194o), w;here the worker had refused to do outside work; Young
Spring & Wire Corp. v. Appeal Board, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1970.57
(1947), where a plant guard had refused to do emergency midnight guard duty;
Siminski v. Champion Spark Plug Co., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1970.34
(1947), where the worker had refused to agree to a change in hours and had
incurred displeasure in several other ways. In Sharkiewicz v. Cushman Chuck
Co., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 1970.051 (1942), where the claimant was
discharged for leaving his machine unattended after company warnings, the
mnachine was damaged and it was found that the claimant's action was delib-
e n, the colrt pointint out that the mere violation of a rule does not always
constitute misconduct. See: Boynton Cab. Co. v. Schroeder, supra. (driver left
cab unattended).
I "The purpose of the unemployment compensation act is to relieve the
distress of economic insecurity due to unemployment. It was enacted in the
interest of public welfare to provide for assistance to the unemployed and as
such is entitled to a liberal interpretation." Godsol v. U.C.C., 302 Mich. 652,
5 N.W. 2d 519 (1943). In further support of the rule of liberal construction,
the Michigan court in Copper Range Co. v. U.C.C., 320 Mich. 460, 31 N.W. 2d
692 (1948), said: "In th face of this legislative declaration of policy, courts are
without power to deprive those entitled thereto of the benefits of the act unless
they are expressly precluded therefrom by its provisions."
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The misconduct, of course, must be connected with the work of
the claimant according to the express language of most State laws.32
No matter how reprehensible it may be, misconduct which occurs
elsewhere and has no direct or necessary connection with the work-
er's job is not properly a basis for disqualification. An unfounded
suit brought in good faith against an employer for a statutory
penalty for reduction of wages without due notice, was held not to
be connected with the plaintiff's work.3 3 Likewise, engaging in a
is not considered to be connected.3 4 On the other hand, where the
claimant had deliberately committed acts of sabotage during a
strike against the employer, the purpose of which was to interrupt
the employer's service to its customers, it was held that such mis-
conduct was connected with the work even though the discharge did
not take place until after the strike was terminated.3 5
VOLUNTARY QUIT
Under the ordinary language of the voluntary quit disqualifi-
cation, there are three questions to consider: (1) whether the
claimant has left his job, (2) whether the leaving was voluntary
and, (3) whether there was "good cause" for his leaving. In the
16 States which qualify good cause, there is the additional question
of whether the good cause is attributable to the employer or con-
nected with the work.
Leaving work, it may be pointed out, imports a complete sever-
ance of the employer-employee relationship.30 In some instances,
however, it is not easy to determine just when severance has oc-
curred. Where a salesman has not made any sales for several
months prior to filing his claim and there was no evidence as to the
reason for such inactivity, it was considered that the relationship
had been severed by the employee.3 7 Similarly, an absence for 6
months without notice was considered a leaving,"s as was an un-
' This may be a natural qualification, even without the express statutory
language. See, Kempfer, Disqualifications for Voluntary Leaving and Mis-
Conduct, 55 YALE L. J. 147, 162 (1945).
M.F.A. Milling Co. v. Murphy, 169 S.W. 2d 929 (Mo. 1943).
drunken altercation away from the place of employment normally
' Elk River Coal & Lumber Co. v. Bd. of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., W.Va.,
par. 8072 (1947).
' Consumers Power Co. v. Smith, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1970.513
(1941).
'Yale & Towne M'fg Co. v. Bd. of Review, 62 A. 2d 99 (Pa. Super. 1948);
Kempfer, op. cit. supra note 32 at 154. See, Dawson v. Empl. Security Bd.,
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Md., par. 8102 (1949).
1Logan-Cache Knitting Mills v. Ind. Comm., 99 Utah 1, 102 P. 2d 495
(1940).
Michalsky v. Bd. of Review, 62 A. 2d 113 (Pa. Super. 1948). The claimant
had remained in jail for 6 months rather than pay support money to his wife
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reasonable extension of a leave of absence, together with a failure
to keep in contact with the employer9
On the second question, where conditions are such that the
claimant was impelled to leave his job and had no real choice in the
matter, it may fairly be said that the leaving was involuntary. This
condition is illustrated by the situation in Fannon v. Federal Cart-
ridge Corporation .40 The claimant became ill as a result of working
with gunpowder and after being transferred to a job pushing heavy
iron trucks loaded with shells in a temperature of 130 degrees, she
finally collapsed and was sent to the hospital. The doctor advised
her that she would not recover as long as she worked in the ord-
nance plant. With respect to these facts, the Minnesota court said:
"While she intended to terminate her employment, and to this ex-
tent it may be argued that such termination was voluntary, on the
other hand, it is clear that her health and personal welfare made
it imperative for her to stop without further delay; in fact, the
evidence indicates that had she not left her work after her collapse
in May 1943, she would in all probability have been carried out of
the plant on a stretcher. An act of necessity may not be a volun-
tary act. . . . We cannot escape the conclusion that where, as here,
an employee is impelled because of sickness and disease to terminate
employment because continuance thereof would endanger his health
and personal welfare, such termination is an involuntary rather
than a voluntary act on the part of the employee within the meaning
of section 4337-27 (A)."4
Where, however, the sickness or other physical condition was
not of such an impelling nature as to force resignation, so that the
element of choice appeared to be present, the leaving is considered
to be voluntary in nature. Cases of ordinary illness or leaving in
order to effect an improvement in health fall within this category.42
In such cases, it becomes necessary to decide whether or not the
condition causing the claimant to leave constituted good cause.
and children-the court pointed out that he had deliberately prolonged his
stay in jail.
Vernon v. Ed. of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Pa., par. 8213 (1949).
219 Minn. 306, 18 N.W. 2d 249 (1945).
Cf. Lafay v. Appeal Board, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1975.412
(1948); Craig v. State, 81 N.E. 2d 615 (Ohio App. 1948). The Ohio Board of
Review has held that a claimant who left his employment because of a severe
case of dermatitis, with secondary infection caused by the oil that he was re-
quired to use while performing his duties as a grinder, was involuntarily un-
employed. Decision No. 700-B.R.-48; C.C.R., U.I. Serv., Ohio, par. 1975.10.
"Amherst Coal Co. v. Ed. of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., W.Va., par.
1975.092 (1947); State v. Ed. of Review, C.C.H., U.I Serv, W.Va., par. 8081
(1948); Riggs Motor Co. v. Empl. Security Comm., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Wyo.,
par. 8063 (1947) ; Ia re Bush, 133 Pa. Super, 518, 3 A. 2d 211 (1938) ; Lafay v.
Appeal Board, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1975.412 (1948) ; Craig v. State,
81 N.E. 2d 615 (Ohio App. 1948).
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Cases where the leaving was due to advanced stages of preg-
nancy have not been handled entirely in accordance with this dis-
tinction. In one,43 it was said that the condition itself had been a
matter of choice with the claimant. In others, 44 it was held that
any separation not the result of a discharge is a voluntary leaving.
The latter reasoning, of course, is highly questionable, and renders
the term "voluntary" meaningless for all pradtical purposes. It is
submitted that a sounder approach would have been to rest the
decision on the extent to which the claimant's condition was con-
sidered compelling. In some cases, certainly, the claimant might
have no choice if she valued her life or that of her child, although
in others she might be physically able to continue almost up to the
time of confinement. As in other cases of sickness or physical dis-
ability, the claimant would not be able to work, and therefore could
not qualify for benefits, until she was back on her feet again and
ready to return to work. Thereafter, the availability requirement
offers sufficient protection.
In Kalamazoo Tank & Silo Corp. v. U.C.C.,3 53 claimants ap-
plied for unemployment insurance benefits for the period during
which they were separated from their jobs because of a picket line
in front of their employer's plant. The picket line was conducted
by striking employees of a subsidiary concern, the Riverside Foun-
dry and Galvanizing Company, which operated an adjoining plant,
common entrances being maintained for both plants. There was
evidence that some of the claimants had sought permission to cross
the picket line and were refused; also, that one of them was picked
up bodily when he attempted to cross the line and placed in his car.
Under these circumstances, and in view of threats of bodily harm
and the employer's failure to afford safe access, the Supreme Court
of Michigan held that there had not been a voluntary leaving within
the meaning of the Michigan act. An alternative ground for the
same result, not mentioned by the court, would have been the fact
that no severance of the employer- employee relation had occurred
and therefore there had been no leaving. 6
Layoffs and plant shutdowns, rather naturally, are to be dis-
tinguished from a voluntary quit. Thus, in Copper Range Company
v. U.C.C.47 a mine shutdown by the employer after the union's re-
fusal of a wage adjustment was held not to constitute a voluntary
43 Moulton v. Empl. Security Comm., 34 N.W. 2d 211 (Iowa 1948).
" John Morrell & Co. v. U.C.C., 69 S.D. 618, 13 N.W. 2d 498 (1944) ; Pack-
ard Motor Car Co. v. U.C.C. and Ruel, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1975.415
(1947).
45 C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 8240 (1949).
46 See, Yale & Towne M'fg Co. v. Board of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Pa.,
par. 8202 (1948).
" 31 N.W. 2d 692 (Mich., 1948).
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leaving. In this case the Michigan Supreme Court considered and
rejected the anomalous doctrine of constructive voluntary leaving.48
Once it has been established that the claimant has left his job,
and that he quit voluntarily, the final, and perhaps the most difficult,
question is whether he had good cause for quitting. As already
pointed out, some States provide specifically that the good cause
must be connected with the claimant's work. It seems clear, and
there is ample authority for the proposition, that without such a
qualification the good cause may consist of reasonable or sufficient
personal reasons.49 As a result, it is extremely important, in con-
sidering existing precedents, to determine whether the statute
involved in each instance contains the qualifying language.
It has been held that leaving work to take care of children after
the husband's death,5" or to take a sick wife back to her home com-
munity,7' is reasonable or compelling enough to constitute good
cause. There is a rather sharp difference of opinion as to whether
leaving simply to join one's husband or wife in another locality is
a cause which is good enough, some saying yes 2 and others holding
that it is not. But it seems to be agreed that leaving to get
married is without good cause.5 4
" Cf. Rhea Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 231 Wis. 643, 285 N.W. 749
(1939), where it was held that the claimant, who was not a member of the
union, had not voluntarily quit when the employer discontinued the dress line
on which she was working rather than accede to union demands.
" In re Teicher, 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A. 2d 739 (1944); Barclay White
Co. v. Board of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 48, 50 A. 2d 336, 340 (1947) ; Montgomery
Ward & Co. v. Board of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1975.01 (1941);
Ben. Ser. 6577-Ill. (V4-10) ; Craig v. State, 81 N.E. 2d 615, 620-621 (Ohio App.
1948); Hollingsworth Tool Works v. Review Board, 84 N.E. 2d 895 (Ind. App.,
1949); Lancaster v. Empl. Sec. Bd., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Md., par. 8101 (1949).
Coi'tr: Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society v. Olsen, 4 N.W. 2d 923
(Neb. 1942).
"Lancaster v. Employment Security Board (Md. Cir. Ct., 1949), C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Md., par. 8101; Accord: Mee's Bakery, Inc. v. Board of Review, 162
Pa. Super. 183, 56 A. 2d 386 (1948), where the claimant quit after her transfer
to the day shift because the change in hours prevented her from getting the
family meals and made her hours the same as her husband's, who had been
caring for the cildren while she was away at night.
'Hollingsworth Tool Works v. Review Board, 84 N.E. 2d 895 (Ind. App.
1949).
-ontgomery Ward & Co. v. Board of Review (Ill. Cir. Ct. 1941), C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Ill., par. 1975.01; In r'e Teicher, 154 Pa. Super. 250, 35 A. 2d 739
(1944).
",,iiami Broadcasting Co. v. Board of Review (Fla. Cir. Ct., 1945), C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Fla., par. 1975.05; Skupa v. Commissioner (Neb. Dist. Ct., 1940),
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Neb., par. 1975.039 (1940) (husband quit to join wife in
another state). See Youngclaus v. Creswell, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Neb., par.
1996.01 (1941) (wife left to joint husband in another city and it was held that
she was not entitled to benefits under the special disqualification applicable to
females whose jobs are discontinued on account of marriage).
1949]
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Some State laws specifically provide that the same factors which
determine the suitability of work offered are to be considered in
deciding whether there is good cause for leaving. The factors most
pertinent in connection with cases of leaving are: (1) the degree of
risk to the claimant's health, safety, and morals, (2) his physical
fitness for the job, (3) his prior training, experience and earnings,
and (4) the distance of the work from his residence. Even without
an express reference to good cause in the suitability definition,
these factors should apply since it would be illogical, to say the
least, to disqualify an individual for leaving work which, under the
terms of the statute, he could refuse to accept, if offered by another,
without affecting his benefit rights. It should also be recognized,
however, that the factors listed are not exclusive.
Where the duties are too arduous or the job is shown to have an
ill effect upon the claimant, it is generally recognized that there is
good cause for quitting. Within this principle fall situations where
the work load of the claimant has been increased, 5 the job involved
a nervous strain,0 the claimant's duties involved physical injury, S
or the claimant was physically unable to do the job assigned.58 In
all these instances, of course, the cause for leaving was connected
with the claimant's work. Changing jobs on the advice of one's
physician has also been held to be a sufficiently good personal reason
to avoid disqualification.5 9
By way of contrast, quitting one job to accept another, to engage
in self-employment, or merely to get a change of scenery, normally
is considered neither to amount to good cause connected with claim-
' S. S. Kresge Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm., 349 Mo. 590, 162 S.W.
2d 838 (1942) ; In re Burkhart, 158 Pa. Super. 564, 45 A. 2d 909 (1946). In the
latter case, in the process of distinguishing the court's decision in the Teicher
case, it was pointed out that there is no legal obligation to be married and that
leaving in such a case is the result of a mere "impulse."
Gray v. Dep't of Ind. Relations, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ala., par. 8151 (1948).
See Henderson v. Dep't of Ind. Relations, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ala., par. 8159
(1949) (additional duties considered inconsequential).
' Moore v. Greyhound Bus Co., O.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ala., par. 8132 (1944).
' Sides v. Dep't of Ind. Relations, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ala., par. 8130 (1947).
H offstat v. Bd. of Review, C.C.R., U.I. Serv., Pa., par. 8212 (1949);
Plafchan v. U.C.C., C.C.H., U.I. Serv, Mich., par. 1975.84 (1947); Hartford
Finance Co. v. Mucha, C.C.R., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 8169 (1947); Alabama
Mills, Inc. v. Brand, C.C.R., U.I. Serv., Ala., par. 8156 (1948); Brashear v.
Empl. Security Bd., C.C.R., U.I. Serv., Md., par. 8103 (1949).
Bliley Vffg. Co. v. Bd. of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 570, 45 A. 2d 908 (1946).
See Craig v. B.U.C., 83 Ohio App. 247, 81 N.E. 2d 615 (1948), where fear of
ill health, unsupported by medical evidence, was held not to be enough. (before
good cause restricted by amendment). Illness which makes the place of em-
ployment untenable only for the particular claimant, however, is not considered
connected with the work. Armstrong v. Empl. Security Comm., O.C.., U.I.
Serv., Iowa, par. 8101 (1948); Lafay v. Appeal Bd., C.C.R., U.I. Serv., Mich.,
par. 1975.412 (1948).
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ant's work"', nor to good personal cause.61 When the new job fails
to materialize or the new venture falls through and the individual
finds himself without a job and tries to claim benefits, he is faced
with disqualification. Such changes apparently are considered to
be at the claimant's own risk.
W1here the claimant was unable to earn adequate compensation
on a piece-work basis at the scale set by the employer, she was held
to have good cause for quitting,6 2 but the mere opinion or belief that
one's salary is not high enough is not considered sufficient for this
purpose.6 A substantial alteration in the terms or conditions of
employment may constitute good cause for quitting, 4 as where a
claimant was changed to night work and her lunch period was
shortened.2 But where an addition to the claimant's work load
was only temporary, he was not considered to have good cause for
quitting," and a claimant's refusal to transfer to other work for
reasons which did not appear compelling resulted in disqualifica-
tion . 7 With the possible exception of the last type of case, these
were all instances where the cause was connected with the work, so
that the differences in statutory language did not affect the result.
It is interesting to note, however, that in several cases the claimant's
own limitations were at least contributing factors.6s
" County Mason Supply, Inc. v. Testa, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., -par. 8159
(1946) (claimant quit to take a new job) ; Connecticut Doughnut Co. v. Gallo,
C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 8160 (1946) (claimant quit to go into business
with another); Blaber v. Dahl Publishing Co., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par.
8207 (1948) (claimant wanted to move to property in a different town). Cf.
Kovach v. Appeal Board, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 8230 (1948) (claimant
was held not to be disqualified for leaving one plant to accept a recall to another
plant of the same employer).
" Ralph Printing Co. v. Kinney, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Neb., par. 1975.06
(1940) (claimant left to go to another State); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock
Co. v. Board of Review, 358 Pa. 224, 56 A. 2d 254 (1948), where the claimant
left to engage in self-employment.
I Just v. American Hardware Corp., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 1975.042
(1945). In a decision which amounts to the same thing, the Michigan Circuit
Court held that a claimant had good cause for quitting where his employer
failed to furnish sufficient work. Johnson v. U.C.C., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich.,
par. 1975.46 (1943).
Sweeney v. Murphy, 262 App. Div. 846 (N.Y. 1944); Kane v. Fafnir
Bearing Co., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 8197 (1948).
Amendola v. Administrator, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 8215 (1949).
Mitchell v. Commonwealth, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mass., par. 1975.015 (1949).
r..Angerhofer v. Board of Review, 163 Pa. Super. 134, 60 A. 392 (1943).
'Edwards & Co. v. Appeal from Unemployment Commissioner, C.C.H.,
U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 8184 (1948) (where the foreman of the new department
made the claimant irritable and nervous, which the court considered a personal
reason); Collins Radio Co. v. Employment Security Commission, C.C.H., U.I.
Serv., Iowa, par. 1975.036 (1943) (where the claimant was to have been trans-
fered from guard to janitorial duties at the same rate of pay).
" See Just v. American Hardware Corp., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par.
1949]
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Minor misunderstandings or petty grievances which may cause
a claimant to become disgruntled and result in his quitting normally
do not furnish the good cause necessary to avoid disqualification.
Where a structural steel designer quit following a disagreement
over the method of performing his work, which he felt did not meet
the standard code of structural engineers and designers, the Illinois
Circuit Court affirmed a Board of Review decision holding that he
did not have good cause for leaving.6 9 A similar result was reached
where the claimant quit because of a penalty imposed for being
tardy,7 0 because of criticism,71 because of a temporary suspension 7 2
or because of dissatisfaction with the employer's method of oper-
ation.73 An accountant who felt that his work involved too many
duties of a clerical nature was considered to have insufficient justi-
fication for quitting.74 Claimant's dissatisfaction with working con-
ditions, which were found to be customary, did not justify leaving
where the statute specified that the good cause must involve fault
on the part of the employer.75
Losing one's regular means of transportation may be good per-
sonal cause for leaving, 76 but it is not considered to be connected
with the work.77 The anticipated need of joining a union is not
good enough78 and neither is a mistaken understanding of the em-
ployer's rule against marriage.71From a review of these authorities, it may be said that any
1975.042 (1945); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mass., par.
1975.015 (1943). Both decisions were favorable to the claimant notwithstanding
the statutory restriction of good cause.
11 Vacek v. Division of Placement and Unemployment Compensation, C.C.H.,
U.I. Surv., par. 8271 (1948) (good cause unrestricted).
11White v. Review Board, 114 Ind. App. 383, 52 N.E. 2d 500 (1944)
(good cause unrestricted).
I Wolfe v. U.C.C., 232 Iowa 1254, 7 N.W. 2d 799 (1943) (good cause re-
stricted).
I Richard v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 217 Minn. 136, 14 N.W. 2d 118 (1941)
(good cause restricted).
I See Brown-Brockmeyer v. Roach, 148 Ohio St. 511, 76 N.E. 2d 79, 82
(1947) (good cause unrestricted at time of case).
I In re Louis Smith, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., N.Y., par. 8441 (1945) (good cause
unrestricted).
Amherst Coal Co. v. Board of Review, 35 S.E. 2d 733 (W.Va., 1945).
Sawyer Biscuit Co. v. Board of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ill., par.
1975.01 (1942).
"Evans v. Alabama Power Co., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Ala., par. 8140 (1947);
Malleable Iron Fittings Co. v. Hall, 15 Conn. Super. 445 (1948); Hatfield-
Campbell Creek Coal Co. v. Board of Review, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., W.Va., par.
1975.117 (1944).
11 Condon v. Worth's Inc., C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Conn., par. 1975.050 (1942)
(good cause restricted).
I Landro v. Kinney, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Neb., par. 1975.041 (1940) (good
cause unrestricted).
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reason which would normally cause a reasonable person to leave his
work will be held to furnish the good cause necessary to avoid the
application of the voluntary quit disqualification. As one court has
put it, the reasons must be compelling, i.e., real not imaginary, sub-
stantial not trifling, reasonable not whimsical. 0 Some uncertainty
is bound to exist, however, as to the standards of reasonableness
which will govern the judgment of the particular tribunal.
The pregnancy and family obligation cases illustrate quite clear-
ly the effect of special disqualification provisions or language ex-
pressly restricting good cause. Pregnancy, for instance, is a condi-
tion which, even if it did amount to good cause for leaving, is clearly
not attributable to the employer.81 Marital or family obligations
likewise are considered to have no connection with the work,82 and
in some States specific disqualifications apply to such cases.S3 These
precedents, like some of the others already mentioned, are in no
sense authority for what constitutes good cause.
To support a determination that the cause for leaving is attri-
butable to the employer or connected with the work, it should not
be necessary to find that the employer has been negligent or in any
other way to blame. It is sufficient if there is good cause arising
out of the job itself as distinguished from factors outside of the
job and having no necessary relation thereto. This point is well
explained by the following language of the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in the Fannon84 case:
As we construe the law, the legislature did not intend that
some wrongful act or negligence be first established by a
claimant before termination of his employment on account of
sickness or disease directly connected therewith could be
said to be for 'good cause attributable to the employer.'
Rather, we feel the legislature intended that, where factors
or circumstances directly connected with employment result
in illness or disease to an employee and make it impossible
for him to continue therein because of serious danger to his
"Bliley Electric Co. v. Board of Review, 158 Pa. Super. 548, 45 A. 2d 898
(1946), quoted with approval in Barclay White Co. v. Board of Review, 56 Pa.
43, 50 A. 2d 336 (1947).
'Moulton v. Employment Security Commission, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Iowa,
par. 8090 (1947).
Ex parte Alabama Textile Corp., 242 Ala. 609, 7 So. 2d 303 (1942) ; Huiet
v. Schwob Mfg. Co., 27 S.E. 2d 743 (Ga. 1943); Davis v. Employment Security
Commission, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Iowa, par. 8078 (1944); Courney v. Appeal
Board, C.C.H., U.I. Serv., Mich., par. 1975.31 (1945).
"'The Ohio law, for instance, disqualifies any individual who has "quit work
to marry or because of marital, parental, filial, or other domestic obligations."
OHIO GPN. CODE, § 1345-6-d(7). See Farloo v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 145
Ohio St. 263, 61 N.E. 2d 313 (1945); Moore v. B.U.C., 73 Ohio App. 362, 56
N.E. 2d 520 (1943).
" Fannon v. Federal Cartridge Corp., 219 Minn. 306, 18 N.W. 2d 249, 252
(1945).
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health, termination of employment for this reason may cor-
rectly be said to be involuntary and for 'good cause attri-
butable to the employer,' even though the employer be free
from all negligence or wrongdoing in connection therewith.
CONCLUSION
The discharge for misconduct and voluntary quit provisions are,
after all, simply common sense limitations upon the risks which the
unemployment insurance account is designed to cover. In this re-
spect they are just like the other eligibility and disqualification
provisions referred to in the introduction. In general, they are
similar to the conditions of an ordinary insurance policy. As nearly
as possible they should be given effect according to the express
terms of the particular statute, and care should be exercised to
apply only the condition or conditions pertinent to the established
facts of the particular case.
There is a tendency in some of the cases to read into the State
acts a general requirement that the unemployment, to be com-
pensable, must be entirely involuntary8 5 or in some way the fault
of the employer. 6 This, it is submitted, is a highly questionable
procedure, particularly where it ignores the express language of the
applicable conditions. Where there is room for judgment in the
interpretation of the legislative terms, or in the application of those
terms to the particular facts, it would be much more appropriate
to consider the general welfare aspects of the unemployment insur-
ance program and to bear in mind the liberal construction which is
normally accorded legislation of'this nature.
See Harrison, Statutory Purpose and Involuntary Unemployment, 55
YALE L. J. 117 (1945).
See Simrell, Employer Fault vs. General Welfare as the Basis of Unem-
ployment Compensation, 55 YALE L. J. 181 (1945).
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